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ESSAY
PROSECUTE, SUE, OR DEPORT? TRANSNATIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
CHIMt-NE I. KEITNERt
INTRODUCTION
On April 8, 2015, the United States deported Salvadoran General Carlos
Eugenio Vides Casanova, whom The New York Times described as "the
highest-ranking foreign official to be deported under laws enacted in 2004
to prevent human rights violators from seeking haven in this country."
Thirteen years earlier, a Florida jury found General Vides and a co-
defendant liable for $54.6 million in damages for torture and killings by El
Salvador National Guard troops under the general's command, the same
conduct for which he was ultimately deported.2 On the same day that
General Vides was deported, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a request
seeking the extradition of Salvadoran Colonel Inocente Orlando Montano
Morales, the former Vice Minister of Defense and Public Safety, to face
murder charges in Spain for his role in the 1989 Jesuit massacre in El
Salvador.'
t Harry & Lillian Hastings Research Chair and Professor of Law, University of California
Hastings College of the Law.
1 Julia Preston, U.S. Deports Salvadoran General Jbr Role in '8os Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,
2015, at A8.
2 Id.
3 United States Seeks Extradition of Former Salvadoran Military Officer to Spain to Face Charges
for Participation in 1989 Jesuit Massacre, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS
(Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-seeks-extradition-former-salvadoran-
military-officer-spain-face-charges [http://perma.cc/YAV9-BNR8]. Montano had been sentenced
(1)
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These cases are high-profile, but not unique. The United States is in the
process of deporting 150 Bosnians who immigration officials believe
participated in war crimes and other atrocities during the 1990s conflict in
the former Yugoslavia.4 The State Department is also seeking to prohibit
the entry of certain accused human rights violators. For example, in February,
the United States announced new visa restrictions for individual Venezuelan
officials accused of human rights violations and corruption in Venezuela.s
Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro condemned the visa restrictions as
an attack on Venezuelan sovereignty.6 Similarly, the chief representative in
Washington of Republika Srpska said that the Bosnians "are being hounded
just because they wore the uniform of the Serbian Army, or the Army of
the Republika Srpska."7 The United States has not found these objections
persuasive as a matter of either law or policy.
When one country imposes consequences for internationally unlawful
conduct on an individual who acted on behalf of another country, it enforces
international law horizontally. This is because sovereign states are, in
theory, situated on a level plane vis-b-vis each other, despite their obvious
differences in size and resources. The principle of sovereign equality and
the need to conduct foreign relations impose certain limits on one state's
ability to exercise jurisdiction over another state or its officials. For example,
sitting heads of state, ambassadors, and foreign ministers, who enjoy
"status-based" or ratione personae immunity, are shielded from the legal
processes of foreign states, even though they are subject to proceedings in
certain international criminal tribunals.8 Other foreign officials, and former
to twenty-one months in prison for visa fraud in August of 2013. Former Salvadoran Military Officer
Sentenced for Perjury and Concealing Information from U.S. Government, DEP'T OF JUST. U.S.
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, DISTRICT OF MASS. (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao-
ma/pr/former-salvadoran-military-officer-sentenced-perjury-and-concealing-information-us
[http://perma.cc/QGM2-66HN].
4 Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Moves to Deport Bosnians; 3oo Linked to '9os War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 2015, at Ai; see also Former Bosnian Prison Guard Extradited to Bosnia-Herzegovina Jbr War
Crimes Trial, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (July 7, 2015),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/formner bosnian-prison-guard-extradited-bosnia-herzegovina-.war-crimes-trial
[http://perma.cc/5VQS-J2H7 ]; ICE Arrests 5o Fugitives Across the US During Operation No Safe
Haven II, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (August 14, 2015),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-arrests-5o-fugitives-across-us-during-operation-no-safe-
haven-ii#wcm-survey-target-id [http://perma.cc/A4GR-LQGM].
5 United States Expands Venezuela Visa Bans, BBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-31104879 [http://perma.cc/LGG4-4VAT].
6 Id.
7 U.S. Wrong to Deport 15o Bosnian Serbs for 'War Crimes'-Serbian Press, SPUTNIK NEWS
(Mar. 4,2015), http://sputniknews.com/europe/2015o304/1019O53466.html [http://perma.cc/PH4 L 3DRK].
8 See Arrest Warrant of n1 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 61
("[A]n incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal proceedings
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heads of state and ambassadors, enjoy "conduct-based" or ratione materiae
immunity for certain official acts, although the precise scope of this immunity
remains contested.9
Some have claimed that the principle of sovereign equality categorically
prohibits one state from exercising jurisdiction over another state's
current-and even its former-officials. This extreme position asserts that,
even if a foreign state itself is not a named defendant, pronouncing on the
lawfulness of conduct that is attributable to a foreign state impermissibly
violates that state's sovereignty. Yet those who take this position rarely
challenge measures, such as immigration consequences, that also involve
pronouncing on the conduct of foreign states. The idea that an individual's
conduct is immune from scrutiny if it is attributable to a foreign state turns
out to be more rhetoric than reality.
This Essay argues that we should view criminal, civil, and immigration
consequences ("detention," "damages," and "deportation") as manifestations
of the same underlying principle: that individual officials can bear personal
responsibility for their acts under international law, and that the domestic
institutions of one state can in certain circumstances attach consequences to
that responsibility without violating the sovereignty of foreign states.
The integrated approach proposed here has at least three important
implications. First, it supports the view that an individual's and a foreign
state's immunity need not be congruent simply because individual and state
responsibility are occasionally concurrent. Second, it suggests that we should
treat states' decisions (and foreign states' reactions) regarding detention,
damages, and deportation as all being relevant to delineating the contours of
conduct-based immunity under customary international law, which is based
on consistent state practice accompanied by a belief that such practice is
legally required (opinio juris). Third, it highlights that, although we tend to
think of state sovereignty in absolute terms, our understandings of
sovereignty-as manifested in the state practice and opinio juris described
below-are actually varied and context-dependent. Our ultimate goal
should be to tailor horizontal enforcement regimes that respect the core of
before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction."); see also Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court art. 27, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 ("Immunities or
special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under
national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a
person.").
9 On March 9, 2015, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari in
Samantar v. Yousuf, leaving intact (for now) the Fourth Circuit's analysis of conduct-based
immunity under United States common law. 699 F.d 763 (4 th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
1528 (2015).
2015] 3
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state sovereignty while promoting individual accountability consistent with
due process.
I. DETENTION: CRIMINAL CONSEQUENCES
The Nuremberg Trials set a precedent for using criminal law to consider
individual responsibility under international law, even though the
consequences of conviction at Nuremberg included remedies such as
restitution of property, which some view as civil in nature.10 As the Israeli
Supreme Court later reasoned in Israel v. Eichmann, "[t]he underlying
principle in international law that governs such crimes is that the individual
who has committed any of them . . . must account in law for his
behaviour."" International treaties such as the Convention Against Torture
emphasize extradition and prosecution as the primary vehicles for individual
accountability, but also contemplate civil penalties.12 U.S. legislation
implementing the Convention Against Torture provides for both criminal
and civil consequences." Although many international lawyers think in
terms of individual criminal responsibility for conduct such as torture,
nothing intrinsically limits individual responsibility to the criminal sphere.14
The provisions of the Convention Against Torture were tested in 1998,
when Spain requested that the United Kingdom extradite Augusto Pinochet
to face criminal charges for torture committed in Chile. Pinochet argued
that he was entitled to conduct-based immunity because his alleged acts
were the acts of a foreign state. The U.K. House of Lords denied immunity
10 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 28, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279 ("In addition to any punishment imposed by it, the Tribunal shall have the right to
deprive the convicted person of any stolen property and order its delivery to the Control Council
for Germany.").
11 CrimA 336/61 Attorney General v. Eichmann 17 PD 2033 (1962) (Isr.), http://www.trial-
ch.org/fileadmin/user-upload/documents/trialwatch/eichmann-appeal.pdf
[http://perma.cc/CX3X-Z7HB].
12 Compare Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment art. 4-5, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
(requiring parties to establish criminal jurisdiction over resident offenders), with id. at art. 14
(requiring parties to establish compensation for victims).
13 18 U.S.C. § 234 0A (2001) (criminalizing torture and attempted torture outside of the Unit-
ed States and conspiracy to commit torture); 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) (creating a civil cause of
action for torture and extrajudicial killing under color of foreign law, but not under color of U.S.
law).
14 James Crawford (now a judge on the International Court of Justice) wrote in 2002: "So far
this principle [of individual responsibility] has operated in the field of criminal responsibility, but
it is not excluded that developments may occur in the field of individual civil responsibility."
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES 312 (2002).
[Vol. 164: 14
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for torture committed after the United Kingdom, Spain, and Chile all had
ratified the Torture Convention.15 They reasoned that, since the
international crime of torture requires state action, it would be logically
inconsistent (and utterly self-defeating) to create a horizontal accountability
regime for torture that allowed defendants to invoke immunity on the
grounds that they had acted on behalf of a foreign state.16 The widespread
adoption of domestic legislation implementing the Rome Statute for the
International Criminal Court (ICC) authorized domestic jurisdiction over
additional forms of internationally unlawful conduct, including conduct
performed under color of foreign law.
Sovereign states themselves are generally immune from suit in other
countries' domestic courts for their non-commercial acts, but the same is
not necessarily true of individuals. Accordingly, in ex parte Pinochet, the
House of Lords acknowledged that Chile itself could not be "impleaded" in
a U.K. court for torture under the U.K. State Immunity Act, but Lord
Millett emphasized that criminal trials of individuals do not implead the
state.7 This approach is consistent with the United States' prosecution and
imprisonment of Chuckie Taylor Jr. for torture committed under color of
Liberian law,18 with the United Kingdom's criminal investigation of Prince
Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa for alleged torture in Bahrain,19 and with the
pending criminal trial in the United Kingdom of a Nepalese army officer for
torture in Nepal,2 0 among other examples. In 2008, the Paris Public
Prosecutor distinguished the allegations against Pinochet from those against
former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, which he deemed fell
within the scope of conduct-based immunity because they "cannot be
15 R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [2000] 1 AC 147
(HL) 156 (appeal taken from Eng.).
16 Id. at 278 (Lord Millett).
17 Id. at 268.
18 See Roy Belfast Jr., A/K/A Chuckie Taylor, Sentenced on Torture Charges, DEP'T OF JUST.
(Jan. 9, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2009/January/o9-crm-O21.html
[http://perma.cc/L7U2-M35E I ("Belfast's prosecution on the torture charges was the first ever
under a statute that criminalizes torture and provides U.S. courts jurisdiction to hear cases
involving acts of torture committed outside the United States .... ).
19 See Oliver Windridge, Removing the Cloak of Immunity-the Director of Public Prosecutions for
England and Wales Accepts No Immunity from Criminal Investigation into Torture, OPINIO JURIS
(Oct. 16, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/I0/I6/guest-post-removing-cloak-immunity-
director-public-prosecutions-england-wales-accepts-immunity-criminal-investigation-torture/
[http://perma.cc/S2PB-XL5 C] ("[T]he DPP appears to have accepted that Prince Nasser does not
enjoy immunity from torture allegations .... ).
20 Id.; see also Owen Bowcott, Nepalese Colonel Faces Torture Trial in UK, GUARDIAN (Feb.
27, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2o15/feb/27/nepalese-colonel-faces-torture-trial-in-uk
[http://perma.cc/KCF7-6K3L] ("Torture, like war crimes, is subject to universal jurisdiction,
allowing those who allegedly committed crimes abroad to be tried in Britain.").
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dissociated from his functions."21 By contrast, in 2015, a French appeals
court determined that U.S. General Geoffrey Miller was subject to subpoena
in response to a criminal complaint lodged by three former Guantanamo
detainees.22 Consequently, some former U.S. officials might avoid traveling
to certain European countries.23 This has the noteworthy effect of making
criminal (and civil) liability the functional equivalent of immigration
measures, again showing the underlying connections among these three
forms of accountability.
II. DAMAGES: CIVIL CONSEQUENCES
In addition to claiming civil damages as parties civiles in criminal
proceedings, injured parties have sought redress against foreign officials
through civil suits. The procedures and remedies associated with civil suits
often differ from those available in criminal trials, but both types of
proceeding impose consequences on defendants for violating a legal duty.
The conceptual difference between civil and criminal proceedings against an
individual from the perspective of respecting state sovereignty is
vanishingly small.
The scope of a domestic court's authority to adjudicate claims and
provide remedies for extraterritorial harms generally depends on legislative
or constitutional authorization. In the United States, the Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA) provides a civil cause of action for torture or
extrajudicial killing committed under color of foreign law. 24 Some plaintiffs
have also invoked the less explicit Alien Tort Statute, a provision in the
1789 Judiciary Act that provides federal courts with jurisdiction over civil
actions for "a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States."25 Relying on these provisions, U.S. courts have
21 Letter from the Public Prosecutor to the Paris Court of Appeal to Patrick Baudouin (Feb.
27, 2008), http://ccrjustice.org/files/RumsfeldFrenchCase_%2oProsecutors%2oDecision o2_o8.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9WAG-RJE
7].
22 La justice frangaise ordonne l'audition de l'ancien commandant de Guantanamo, LE MONDE
(Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2015/o4/o2/la-justice-francaise-ordonne-l-
audition-de-l-ancien-commandant-de-guantanamo_46o8666_3222.html [http://perma.cc/84T5-
TCEA].
23 See Julian Borger, Senate Report on CIA Torture Could Lead to Prosecutions of Americans
Abroad, GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/1o/cia-report-
prosecutions-international-law-icc [http://perma.cc/VGL3-EV4U] ("US officials and military
officers implicated by the Senate report on torture could face arrest in other countries as a result of
investigations by their national courts .... ).
24 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256; io6 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).
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awarded money damages against foreign defendants who have come within
their personal jurisdiction.26
An individual's harmful conduct may constitute both a crime and a tort
from the perspective of a domestic legal system. In the United States, civil
and criminal proceedings are not fungible-for example, civil proceedings
cannot perform the function of incapacitation-but they can have overlapping
goals, including norm articulation, symbolic vindication for the victims, and
general deterrence. Both types of proceeding impose consequences for
violations of legal norms designed to protect individuals.
Civil proceedings in U.S. courts have drawn more criticism than criminal
proceedings because they are party-initiated. The ultimate decision to allow
a particular case to proceed rests with the judiciary rather than the executive
branch, although judges often defer to the executive branch's determination
that adjudicating a case would have untenable foreign policy consequences.
When defendants assert conduct-based immunity from civil proceedings,
they argue that imposing civil consequences on individual officials is
tantamount to "impleading" the foreign state. However, where only the
individual defendant's assets are at stake, civil proceedings do not "implead"
the foreign state any more than criminal penalties or immigration
consequences for the same underlying conduct.27 Nevertheless, some courts
in the United Kingdom and Canada have interpreted their State Immunity
Acts as providing immunity from civil (but not criminal) proceedings for
human rights violations to current and former officials of foreign states,
compounding the tendency to treat these forms of consequences as distinct.28
26 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 86o (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (awarding over $10
million in damages under the Alien Tort Statute in an action against a former Paraguayan police
official). For another example, see Kadic v. Karadii6, 70 F.3d 232, 239-41 (2d Cir. 1995), which
applied the Alien Tort Statute to Karadii6, the President of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska.
This decision led to a default judgment and jury award of $745 million against Karadii6 in August
of 2000. Punishing War Criminals, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 18, 2000),
http://www.csmonitor.com/2ooo/o818/plos.html [http://perma.cc/H367-UDSL].
27 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2290-92 (2010).
28 See, e.g., Kazemi Esate v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62, [20141 3 S.C.R. 176,
para. 2 (Can.) (holding that Iranian officials had immunity in a civil suit arising out of the torture
of a Canadian journalist while in Iran); Jones v. Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya AS
Saudiya [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 AC (HL) 270 [131 (appeal taken from Eng.) (finding that
Saudi Arabian officials had immunity against civil claims arising out of torture that occurred in
Saudi Arabia). A chamber of the European Court of Human Rights later held that the U.K.'s
grant of immunity did not interfere disproportionately with the claimants' right of access to court
under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Jones v. United Kingdom, App.
Nos. 34356/06 & 40528/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014) 32 para. 215, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=ooi-
14ooo5#"itemid":["001-1400o5"] [http://perma.cc/T9TJ-KK6E].
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III. DEPORTATION: IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES
Immigration consequences have received less attention in this context
than criminal and civil proceedings. In some respects, however, immigration
measures should elicit greater concern from potential defendants. The
procedural protections available to individuals accused of internationally
unlawful acts on behalf of foreign states are often less robust in the
immigration context.
The U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Special Investigations (now
the Office of Human Rights and Special Prosecutions) has worked to secure
the voluntary departure and involuntary removal of Nazi-era war criminals
from the United States.2 9 These conduct-based immigration measures
impose personal consequences on i dividuals for carrying out the policies of
a foreign government in foreign territory.3 0 In fact, certain grounds for
inadmissibility (which include grounds for denying entry to the United
States, and grounds for removal from the United States) specifically require
action on behalf of a foreign state, including committing particularly severe
violations of religious freedom,31 participation in Nazi persecution,32 or
committing acts of torture or extrajudicial killing under color of foreign
law.33
29 Status-based international law immunities do not prevent a host country from compelling
a foreigner to leave or denying entry; to the contrary, the accepted procedure when a foreign
diplomat commits a crime on the territory of a host state is to declare the individual persona non
grata and require his or her departure. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 9, Apr. 18,
1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
30 As a technical matter, the grounds for deportation might be giving false information on
immigration documents, but the substantive bar relates to the individual's pre-application
conduct. See, e.g., In re D-R-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 445, 450-53 (B.I.A. 2011) (upholding an order for
removal based on misrepresentation of a material fact and extrajudicial killing); see also Glenna
MacGregor & Jessica C. Morris, Human Rights Enforcement in U.S. Immigration Law: A Missed
Opportunity for Engagement with International Law?, 5 J. MARSHALL L.J. 467, 481 (2012) (discussing
In re D-R-); William J. Aceves & Paul L. Hoffman, Using Immigration Law to Protect Human Rights:
A Legislative Proposal, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 657, 663 (1999) (noting reliance on concealment or
misrepresentation as grounds for deportation).
31 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(G) (2013) ("Any alien who, while serving as a foreign government
official, was responsible for or directly carried out, at any time, particularly severe violations of
religious freedom . . . is inadmissible."); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182e (denying admission to foreign
nationals that "have been directly involved in the establishment or enforcement of population
control policies forcing a woman to undergo an abortion against her free choice or forcing a man
or woman to undergo sterilization against his or her free choice").
32 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3 )(E)(i) (listing aliens who participated in Nazi persecutions as
ineligible for admission into the United States).
33 See 8 U.S.C. § n82(a)(3)(E)(iii) (noting that any alien who committed an act of torture or
extrajudicial killing outside of the United States is ineligible for a visa or admission into the
United States).
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The so-called "persecutor bar" and related provisions focus on an
individual's past acts, not on any current threat she may pose to national
security interests. The criminal consequences, civil penalties, and immigration
responses (including denial of entry, removal, and prosecution for fraud)
described here all signal disapproval of certain types of unlawful conduct
and prevent host countries from serving as a safe haven for human rights
violators. Although denying entry might be thought of as withholding of a
benefit rather than imposing a sanction, this distinction seems illusory when
the consequence is an individual's physical removal from her country of
residence.3 4
Countries including the United States have also used travel bans against
named foreign officials to condemn human rights violations and to influence
current policy. In 2011, a U.S. Presidential Proclamation consolidated
previous executive orders and banned the entry of "persons who participate
in serious human rights and humanitarian law violations and other abuses."5
In February 2014, the State Department imposed a visa ban on twenty
senior Ukrainian officials accused of being in the "chain of command
responsible for ordering" a violent crackdown on protesters.36 A later series
of executive orders expanded the list of Russian and Ukrainian officials
subject to visa bans and other sanctions.7 These measures, which can also
be accompanied by asset freezes,8 reinforce the idea that individuals who
engage in internationally unlawful conduct can face personal consequences
even when they act on behalf of foreign states, without running afoul of
34 A list of notable actions by the United States is available from U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. Human Rights Violators Investigations, U.S. IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (last updated Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/hrv.htm
[http://perma.cc/XNQ3-ZAKN]. Although the Anti-Atrocity Alien Deportation Act of 2003, S.
710, io8th Cong. (2003), was not enacted, language from the bill was incorporated into the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, ii8 Stat. 3638
(2004). For the legislative history of the Anti-Atrocity Act, see S. REP. NO. 108-209 at 3 (2003).
35 Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Persons Who Participate in Serious
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Violations and Other Abuses, Presidential Proclamation No.
8697, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,277 (2011).
36 Stephen Castle & Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Imposes Visa Ban on 20 Ukrainian Officials as
Further Sanctions Are Threatened, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/world/europe/ukraine-reaction.html?_r=o
[http://perma.cc/7YGF-PCSE].
37 Ukraine and Russia Sanctions, U.S. ST. DEP'T, (last visited Aug. 8, 2015),
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/ [http://perma.cc/7 EQX-GC8T].
38 See, e.g., Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, S. 284, n4 th Cong. (2015).
The bill was reintroduced by Senators Bill Cardin and John McCain this January. Cardin, McCain
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either domestic or international law. Sovereignty does not inexorably trump
accountability; it depends on the context and what other values are at stake.
CONCLUSIONS
Bright-line immunity rules might be alluring, but they do not always
best reflect the realities of inter-state relations or serve the needs of the
international community. Holding individuals responsible for international
law violations can involve-and require-pronouncing on foreign states'
conduct. This is not necessarily objectionable. Treating criminal, civil, and
immigration consequences (detention, damages, and deportation) as
manifestations of a common phenomenon, rather than in isolation, can help
us design more conceptually and octrinally coherent accountability regimes
across geographic borders.
Preferred Citation: Chimhne I. Keitner, Prosecute, Sue, or Deport?
Transnational Accountability in International Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 1
(2015), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-1.pdf.
